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Those who forget the past: An ethical challenge from the history of  treating deviance  1
Emily McTernan 
Treating those who commit crimes or behave in ways deemed socially undesirable with med-
ical interventions targeting the brain, or ‘neurointerventions’, comes with a history. That histo-
ry is one full of  appalling cases and this chapter’s purpose is to argue that this should affect 
our assessment of  whether it is ethical to try again. Among many other examples, there is the 
chemical castration of  men convicted of  consensual same-sex sexual acts, such as Alan Turing 
who committed suicide two years later. There is the use of  electric shocks to treat those 
deemed ‘criminally insane’, aggressive, or in general ‘non-compliant’. In its early incarnation, 
shock treatment came with severe side effects, including broken bones, spinal injuries, and 
memory loss.   Further, shock treatment was sometimes deliberately misused, as in the case of  2
the ‘Georgia power cocktail’, which was used to punish the uncooperative in Milledgeville 
State Hospital, Georgia.  3
As a final example of  perhaps the most infamous treatment in the history of  neuroint-
erventions, there is the use of  lobotomies in an attempt to achieve what was deemed socially 
desirable behaviour. On one estimate, some 60,000 lobotomies were carried out in the US and 
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Europe between 1936 and 1956.  Famous cases include the lobotomies carried out on Howard 4
Dully, who was lobotomised at age 12 for his ‘defiant’ personality, and on Rosemary Kennedy, 
who was left incapacitated and institutionalised.  One route to grasp the wrongs done is offered 5
by Herman Snow’s review in 1949 of  twenty-seven, mostly female, patients who were loboto-
mised.  Snow describes the behaviours that motivated the lobotomies and what he deemed the 6
positive outcomes of  treatment. In one case, Snow describes a woman who was before treat-
ment, ‘uncooperative, distractible, irrelevant, untidy.  Those patients for whom the treatment 7
was deemed to work were variously made ‘neat’, ‘tidy’ and compliant, becoming ‘well dressed’, 
with ‘better eating manners’.  For the pursuit of  such socially desirable behaviours, invasive and 8
radical surgery, which often compromised intellectual abilities such as abstract reasoning or the 
capacity to make future plans, was deemed appropriate. 
Cases like the above may account for a certain hesitation over embracing the modern 
incarnation of  such interventions.  A variety of  suggestions of  potential contemporary neu9 -
rointerventions have been made, including treating those who are aggressive by lowering their 
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testosterone or providing antidepressants; chemically castrating sex offenders; drugging offend-
ers to lessen impulsiveness or to encourage them to conform to society’s rules; or engaging in 
forms of  brain stimulation.  This chapter examines what force, if  any, the appalling nature of  10
the history of  using neurointerventions to respond to socially undesirable behaviour has when 
we assess these contemporary proposals. Does some course of  action having a bad history pro-
vide reason to object to it and, if  so, under what conditions?  
My purpose is not to offer a conclusive case against neurointerventions, but rather to 
defend the relevance of  the history of  this approach to tackling socially undesirable behaviour, 
when addressing its ethical prospects. Recent work on treating crime through neurointerven-
tions at times fails to mention that history, or mentions it only in passing.  Further, proponents 11
of  one popular variety of  applied ethics are likely to hold that such historical cases are an irrel-
evance, preferring abstract imaginary examples taken not to distract us from core ethical issues 
such as whether these treatments require consent. 
 In contrast, this chapter argues that to ignore the history is to miss an important 
dimension of  the ethical debate and, hence, that we have reason to engage with real, historical 
cases as well as imaginary ones. History is relevant here not out of  a concern about compensat-
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ing victims of  past injustice but, instead, as a source of  epistemic clues in our assessment of  
the ethical prospects of  neurointerventions. In what follows, I will argue that the history pro-
vides a defeasible reason or presumption against treating those who commit crimes or act in 
socially undesirable ways through neurointerventions. 
Section 1 formulates a pessimistic induction from the bad history of  neurointerventions 
in treating socially undesirable behaviour to their current incarnations. Section 2 then outlines 
the role such a pessimistic induction should play in our ethical thinking. The remainder of  the 
chapter addresses the prospects for the defender of  neurointerventions as a way to treat socially 
undesirable behaviour, in light of  the pessimistic induction. In section 3, I argue that two ap-
parent defences of  modern neurointerventions are inadequate. In concluding, I consider what 
we can learn from the broader context in which the pessimistic induction places neurointerven-
tions, as amongst other medical interventions that aim at the social good. 
1. A pessimistic induction 
First then, how and when does a bad history matter, in the sense of  providing some grounds to 
object to a revival of  a particular policy or course of  action? The simplest answer would be the 
following inductive argument. Having been mistaken in the past, we have reason to think that 
we would continue to get things wrong by following a relevantly similar approach now. So, lo-
botomies were at one point regarded as a cutting edge technology and much praised, but now 
many regard them as a serious scientific mistake.  Thus, we should be wary of  altering the 12
brains of  criminals, for fear of  making the same kind of  serious mistake. 
Yet all of  medicine, and science more generally, is open to the challenge that it has been 
 For one discussion of  the change in attitudes towards lobotomies, in the context of  deep brain stimula12 -
tion as a new proposed therapy, see Jennell Johnson, ‘A dark history: memories of  lobotomy in the new 
era of  psychosurgery’ Medicine Studies 1.4 (2009), pp. 367-378, pp. 367-8. As evidence of  the approval of  
lobotomies as a form of  treatment, consider that a Nobel Prize was awarded to Egas Moniz in 1949 for 
his work in the area.
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mistaken before, so why not think that it is so now? One classic challenge to scientific realism 
is a formulation of  something like this thought: the pessimistic meta-induction. To give a 
rough formulation, our past scientific theories turned out to be false despite seeming successful 
at the time and so, by induction, we have no reason to think that our current scientific theories 
are true despite their successes.  Such caution based on previous mistakes in science is not en13 -
tirely irrelevant; for instance, it is worth being cautious before assuming that we currently have 
the right account of  how the brain works. Putting to one side this general challenge to scientif-
ic realism, however, is there any objection targeting the use of  neurointerventions to treat so-
cially undesirable behaviour in particular, which does not generalise to all and any other courses 
of  action based on scientific knowledge? 
Consider more precisely how we have been wrong about neurointerventions when they 
were playing this role in the past: they were ethically appalling.  What goes wrong is not only a 14
scientific mistake but also a moral one. Evidently, part of  what is wrong with lobotomies and 
the like is their scientific shortcomings. We think that lobotomies were an insufficiently ad-
vanced, overly blunt way to intervene in the brain, or that electric shock therapies were deliv-
ered with insufficient care. But, then, the lobotomised woman would not engage in the same 
kinds of  behaviour afterwards as she did before. In one sense, the treatment was effective by 
the lights of  what the doctors intended. Another part of  what went wrong in the historical cas-
es though, and the part that this chapter focuses on, is that people were wronged by these 
treatments.  
 For one formulation of  this see L. Laudan, ‘A Confutation of  Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of  Science, 13
48 (1981), pp. 19–48.
 It might be objected that formulating an ethical pessimistic induction adopts the wrong attitude to his14 -
tory. One might insist that we cannot judge history this way, that there would be something anachronistic 
in imposing our moral code to judge those in the past and their behaviour. To respond, I remain neutral 
on how and if  we can hold those in the past accountable. I address our ethical decision making now, and 
ask how the history might be relevant. From here at least these past actions are morally  appalling.
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First, those who suffered treatment were harmed and/or put at risk of  harm; for ex-
ample, losing central intellectual capacities in the case of  lobotomies or suffering broken bones 
in the early versions of  electric shock treatments. These consequences can be viewed as unin-
tended side effects of  an undeveloped science, but they are also a way in which the treatments 
were ethically problematic: people were harmed or put at risk of  harm. Whenever we try out 
new treatments, or even use known treatments, we risk doing harm through side effects, fore-
seen or unforeseen, and that should affect our moral assessments of  that course of  action.  15
Second, some of  the treatments had objectionable goals. In some cases, those treated were not 
the appropriate subjects of  such interventions, including defiant children or men engaging in 
consensual same-sex relations. So too, in some cases the interventions had inappropriate ends, 
such as aiming at compliance or patients becoming ‘neat’ and ‘tidy’. Third, some of  the inter-
ventions involved means that were in excess of  their intended ends: the treatments were dis-
proportionate in effects, or in their degree of  invasiveness, for the outcomes at which the doc-
tors aimed (i.e. the intended benefits of  the treatment). A full account of  the wrongness of  
past neurointerventions likely appeals to both the scientific shortcomings and such a cluster of  
ethical wrongdoings. In contrast, not all flawed science wrongs people. 
So, in the case of  neurointerventions the mistake is not only scientific but also 
moral. To restate my proposed pessimistic induction then, if  a course of  action has been 
historically ethically terrible we have reason to doubt that it is now the correct course of  
action to take.  For this chapter’s purposes, I understand ‘course of  action’ broadly and 16
inclusively, as a description of  the choice to Φ, as well as in fact carrying out Φ, and the 
manner in which it is carried out. Previously, it has been unethical to engage in neurointer-
ventions to target socially undesirable behaviour. So we should be wary of  introducing 
 With thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this clarification. The discussion of side effects is contin15 -
ued later in the chapter.
 A stronger formulation would be to claim that we have no reason to think it the right course of action to take, 16
given historical mistakes. 
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such neurointerventions into our criminal justice system now: we have a defeasible reason 
or presumption against engaging in these neurointerventions.  Indeed, a similar form of  17
this pessimistic induction regarding potential scientific advances also appears in popular 
thinking about eugenics. After the twentieth century, some think that eugenics is no longer 
an acceptable area of  scientific inquiry, given how wrong it went not only under the Nazis, 
but also in the US and Europe where, for instance, some faced compulsory sterilisation.  18
Before considering the implications of  this pessimistic induction, I first address 
three issues with its formulation, the first two regarding its extension and the last, its pes-
simism. First, then, one might ask whether the pessimistic induction can extend to any 
courses of  action with a bad history, whether or not these are scientifically informed. In a 
similar vein, the reader may wonder why scientific errors have been included alongside the 
moral ones above, as in the case of  side effects. What work is done by invoking the scien-
tific means? The chapter focuses only on cases where certain scientifically informed means 
have a history of  ethical wrongdoing and it is beyond its scope to fully explore the differ-
 Mine is a historically based principle, but there may be some relation to the non-historical precautionary 17
principle, where, roughly, in the face of  scientific uncertainty, we should take precautions where harm 
may be caused. For a discussion see Stephen M. Gardiner, ‘A core precautionary principle’ Journal of  Politi-
cal Philosophy 14, 1 (2006), pp. 33-60. Alternatively, one might consider discussions of  how scientists 
should deal with the risk that their findings are wrong when they communicate with the public, e.g. 
Stephen John, ‘Inductive risk and the contexts of  communication’, Synthese, forthcoming. But note, my 
focus is on policy making or what we do as a society, and not on how scientists should alter their com-
munications or findings given the risks in getting things wrong. 
 For details, see Elof  Axel Carlson, The unfit: A history of  a bad idea (New York: Cold Spring Harbor Lab18 -
oratory Press, 2001); Michael G. Silver, ‘Eugenics and compulsory sterilization laws: Providing redress for 
the victims of  a shameful era in United States history’ George Washington Law Review 72 (2004), pp. 
862-892. Allan Buchanan describes the ‘ethical autopsy’ that has occurred after eugenics in his ‘Institu-
tions, beliefs and ethics: Eugenics as a case study’, Journal of  Political Philosophy 15, 1 (2007), pp. 22-45, 
where he proposes an alternative to the conventional account.
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ences that come from extending the pessimistic induction beyond such cases. However, 
there is reason to think that the involvement of  science makes some, perhaps small, differ-
ence to the strength of  a pessimistic induction. In general, we face uncertainty when mak-
ing ethical choices concerning the full consequences of  our actions. Still, our degree of  
uncertainty seems to be perhaps increased by involving scientific means. Many times, scien-
tific findings are later revised. In particular, medical and psychiatric interventions often 
turn out to have unanticipated side effects, some of  which end up being severe. And neu-
rointerventions are for the most part new(ish) treatments or, at the least, often not tested 
in the population at hand, such as trying to treat aggression rather than depression with 
anti-depressants. The use of  scientific means thus alters the ethical assessment.  
As the second issue with extension, it might be objected that the reformulated version 
of  a pessimistic induction may overgeneralise, as did the purely scientific version with which 
this section began. In particular, the history of  medicine is one of  appalling things being done 
and of  direct harms to persons, although, admittedly, often with good intentions. These in-
clude, among many others, performing leg amputations without general anaesthetic; experi-
menting on vulnerable populations, like children with disabilities; and a state of  affairs where it 
was safer to give birth on the street on the way to the hospital than in the hospital.  Not all of  19
these may be convincing as instances of  wrongdoing. For instance, amputation without anaes-
thetic may have been the best among a set of  bad options. All the same, one might think there 
is enough wrongdoing to run a general pessimistic induction for medicine. Yet, surely we do 
not want to say that practicising medicine is ethically suspect? 
 On childbirth, for a summary and statistics, see, for instance, Caroline M. De Costa ‘The contagious19 -
ness of  childbed fever: A short history of  puerperal sepsis and its treatment’ Medical Journal of  Australia 
177.11/12 (2002), pp. 668-672. On amputation and surgery see, for instance, Roy Porter, Blood and guts: A 
short history of  medicine (New York City: WW Norton & Company, 2004). On experiments on children with 
disabilities – defending it, and from one of  the people involved in the study that infected children aged 3-
10 with hepatitis - see Saul Krugman, ‘The Willowbrook hepatitis studies revisited: ethical aspects’ Review 
of  Infectious Diseases 8.1 (1986), pp. 157-162.
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The reply to this is two-fold. First, giving a more precise account of  the wrongdoing 
of  neurointerventions being used to treat socially undesirable behaviour grounds a stronger 
pessimistic induction than that which could be formulated for medicine in general. In many 
of  the medical cases, the intention was to help the person treated and harm is done acciden-
tally. In contrast, for these neurointerventions, there is not only harm done to individuals, 
but also the harm is motivated by a desire to fit individuals into society or to make society 
better in ways that were objectionable. Further, this particular variety of  wrongdoing is 
shared by a set of  central cases where a pessimistic ethical induction is attractive and com-
pelling. It is true of  the worst elements of  the history of  psychiatry, where we ‘treat’ to fit 
people to social norms or ideals of  socially desirable behaviour, and so remove from society 
those whose behaviour does not fit: the rebellious or noncompliant woman, for instance.  It 20
is true of  the history of  eugenics, where attempts were made to make a ‘better’ society or 
‘better’ people, and resulted in, for instance, forcible sterilisation of  those with disabilities.  21
And it is true of  treating criminals and the socially disobedient with neurointerventions. 
As such, for the set of  cases just detailed, there can be a strong formulation of  an ethi-
cal pessimistic induction. Aiming at the social good through medical interventions has been 
deeply unethical in the past. This gives us a reason for thinking that it will continue to be so, 
and so a (defeasible) reason why we should not use medical interventions to aim at social con-
trol or a ‘better society’. Some might think that the history of  neurointerventions to treat so-
cially undesirable behaviour is not on a par with the excesses of  psychiatry or eugenics in the 
twentieth century, in its degree of  wrongdoing. However, if  this form of  the ethical pessimistic 
induction holds, insofar as neurointerventions for socially undesirable behaviour are relevantly 
 On the history of  women in psychiatric care see, for instance, Elaine Showalter, The female malady: 20
Women, madness, and English culture, 1830-1980 (New York CityL Pantheon, 1985). For a counterargument, 
see Joan Busfield ‘The female malady? Men, women and madness in nineteenth century Britain’ Sociology 
28, 1 (1994), pp. 259-277.
 See footnote 17 for references.21
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similar to this set of  wrongful actions, then that broader history of  greater wrongdoing 
strengthens the case against neurointerventions. Further, there is nothing ad hoc about group-
ing neurointerventions for socially undesirable behaviour with eugenics and the worst elements 
of  psychiatry. These are cases that share both method and aim: of  treating people, via medical 
interventions, for the sake of  the social good. 
As the second aspect of  the reply to the extension objection, there may not be, in fact, 
any overgeneralisation if  we also formulate a pessimistic induction for medicine, albeit a weak-
er one. Consider the various restrictions on the behaviour and power of  doctors, which we 
might consider a response to a bad history. For instance, many countries insist on informed 
consent from patients, and have a stringent approval system for new drugs and ethical ap-
proval systems for experiments. I return to these in more detail later in the chapter. But they 
appear to be answers to a pessimistic induction, providing ways to block its force by removing 
or mitigating the causes of  previous wrongdoing. In short, perhaps medicine also faces a pes-
simistic induction, but the continued practice of  medicine is defensible owing to these new 
protections for patients.  
The third concern about the formulation of  the pessimistic induction arises from the 
above discussion of  medicine. It might be argued that at least in the case of  medicine, and 
perhaps in the case of  neurointerventions for socially undesirable behaviour, I could have 
formulated an optimistic induction rather than pessimistic one. Let us start with the stronger 
of  the two cases. In general, one might argue, medicine is a success. A great many people 
have been helped rather than harmed. So, does it follow that having done good in the past 
with medicine, we have reason to think that medical interventions are a way to continue to do 
good, or some presumption in favour of  medical intervention? Wouldn’t the good effects of  
medicine outweigh the bad? 
Further, perhaps one could construct a similar argument for neurointerventions as a 
response to socially undesirable behaviour. One could argue that psychiatry’s brain interven-
tions have, on average, done good and place neurointerventions for undesirable behaviour 
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amongst these – although I suspect that this claim of  doing good on average would be tricky 
to defend, given the historical facts. Alternatively, one could seek to re-situate neurointerven-
tions as one among many medical treatments. As such, perhaps we can defend pursuing 
change through this particular medical intervention strategy, given the broader successes of  
medicine. 
To reply, first, an optimistic induction where the wrongdoing is simply cancelled 
out by the good done assumes a simplistic consequentialist view, where all we are con-
cerned about is overall benefit, aggregating across individuals. Instead, one might hold that 
to respect the separateness of  persons we should not aggregate in that way, or deny that 
rights violations can be justified on the grounds of  overall benefit. In addition, such an 
optimistic induction looks likely to be unhelpful in guiding our current practices. It won’t 
show us how to make things better. In contrast, a pessimistic induction that, say, casts 
doubt on the advisability of  letting doctors alone determine what is best for patients can 
be a useful guide to how to improve practice. We have reasons for caution and reason to 
create safeguards where medicine has gone wrong before. In the next two sections, I ex-
amine the role that the pessimistic induction should play in our ethical reasoning, demon-
strating how the bad history of  medicine could be – and to some extent – is answered. 
The second reply is that we have good reason to place neurointerventions in a category 
with interventions like eugenics and ‘bad’ psychiatry in order to form a pessimistic induction, 
and not ‘good’ psychiatry or medicine in general in order to form an optimistic induction. 
Namely, given their similarity in aims and methods, there is nothing ad hoc about grouping neu-
rointerventions with eugenics and bad psychiatry: all these aim at making ‘better’ people, with 
ideals about how people ought to be or behave motivated by appeals to the good of  society. Of  
course, how to divide up courses of  action into groups will always be open to debate. There is 
unlikely to be a single right way. Nonetheless, a history of  wrongdoing is not answered or un-
dermined by grouping some course of  action with some other benign courses of  action that 
are different in the salient respects - the respects that make a difference, morally speaking. 
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2. Against starting from nowhere 
In the context of  ethics, however, one might doubt that the inductive move detailed above has 
force. Why not echo Ryberg, and say about neurointerventions that ‘obviously former cases of  
use or misuse of  such interventions do not imply that treatment cannot be properly applied’?  22
This section outlines the role of  a pessimistic ethical induction in our moral reasoning. A bad 
history does not show a treatment cannot be properly applied but, rather, means that perform-
ing such treatments both requires a particular kind of  justification and opens the agents in-
volved to moral criticism.  
So, suppose that I intend to do good by Φ-ing, but it goes wrong and in retrospect we 
judge that Φ-ing was appalling: that, say, it did someone harm and was morally reprehensible. I 
then try to do good in the same way, again Φ-ing. As a rough attempt to capture the intuitive 
ethical principle in play, I am plausibly open to moral criticism for Φ-ing again, unless I have 
good grounds for holding that the two cases where I Φ-ed were relevantly dissimilar. So, take a 
surgeon who thinks that they have come up with a new way to perform some procedure. The 
surgeon tries it out, with terrible results. Then, the surgeon tries it a second time. The first 
might be forgivable, but the second opens the surgeon to moral criticism, barring some ade-
quate justification of  repeating the mistake.   23
To spell out the moral idea here further, first, one might observe that an agent who 
pays no attention to her past mistakes does not act well, morally speaking. Or, for those who 
resist relating the permissibility of  acts to an agent’s character, this agent is a poor moral agent. 
She fails to possess the kind of  practical intelligence that good moral agents possess. In par-
ticular, we might accuse her of  a kind of  ethical hubris in her disregard for what has gone 
wrong in the past. That ethical hubris wrongs those who are affected by her acts: the agent 
fails to take due care and seems guilty of  a kind of  negligence. She imposes a known risk on 
 Ryberg ‘Punishment, pharmacological treatment, and early release’, at p.242.22
 With thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this example. 23
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another, without sufficient justification. The agent who ignores the past also suffers from an 
epistemic shortcoming. Someone who fails to learn from her mistakes, or to take them as a 
reason to reconsider, is unlikely to succeed in achieving her aims. She seems to fail to use in-
ductive reasoning, which is a fairly serious shortcoming in coming to know about the world. 
Second, when I Φ again, then there seems to be an extra justification required for my 
actions, one which was not present the first time. To illustrate this, consider the person who has 
Φ inflicted on her for the second time and her grounds for complaint. She can reasonably ask, 
why didn’t you know better, given the history of  attempts? I have to answer why Φ was differ-
ent this time, why I wasn’t really Φ-ing, or why Φ-ing is now defensible, such as by showing 
that Φ-ing was better than the alternatives, including inaction. If  I fail to answer that reason-
able demand for justification, then I am open to moral criticism – and not only for failing, but 
for failing again.   24
Returning to neurointerventions to treat socially undesirable behaviour and their his-
tory, then, one can demand an account of  why the modern incarnation of  such neurointer-
ventions is unlike those cases where we lobotomised non-conforming women, chemically 
castrated men accused of  same-sex relations, and gave electric shock treatment to the ‘non-
compliant’. Without that, one is vulnerable to charge of  ethical hubris and failing to justify 
one’s action. This restates the ethical pessimistic induction: we have a case for thinking that 
neurointerventions as a means to tackle socially undesirable behaviour would be an ethical 
mistake again, since they were in the past, and now we have to answer that case. To make 
the case that neurointerventions now are different to neurointerventions then, the details 
of  the history would become relevant to determine whether the two sets of  cases are simi-
lar enough for the principle above to apply: that both are ‘Φ-ing’. 
To illustrate the role of  an ethical pessimistic induction and how to answer it, consider 
 Various moral approaches might spell this out differently. This is admittedly sketchy but partly deliber24 -
ately. Even a consequentialist should worry about hubris in the ethical sphere, with regards to the likeli-
hood an agent will succeed in doing good.
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again the case of  medicine. I suggested that medicine, too, might be the subject of  an ethical 
pessimistic induction, albeit a weaker one. Consider, then, a doctor who treats a patient with 
some medical intervention. There must be, in principle, some way to justify doing so against a 
history of  medical mistakes. Often, however, such a justification is available, for two reasons. 
First, there are often grounds for arguing that a medical intervention is likely to work, or that 
on balance, its good effects outweigh the bad, given careful experiments and trials of  the treat-
ment proposed. That will meet the demands of  justification stemming from one form of  the 
ethical pessimism for medicine regarding the harm to individuals of  previous treatments, and so 
make it unlike previous medical interventions that lacked such evidence. Note, this is not going 
to be a fruitful line for the proponent of  neurointerventions for socially undesirable behaviour 
to take, since inadvertent harm is not the place from which that pessimistic induction draws its 
force.  
Of  course, there are other aspects to the wrongdoing in medicine, and there are other 
responses to give to these. So, in light of  the wrongfulness of  the history aside from causing 
accidental harm, we have sought to limit how doctors can behave. We try to reign in their ethi-
cal hubris by ensuring patient rights are respected, requiring informed consent rather than doc-
tors doing what they think best, restricting who can be experimented on, having checks on doc-
tors’ performance, and so on. Again, then, the case can be made that doctors do not engage in 
the same kind of  intervention as found in the most ethically problematic elements of  medical 
history. These changes to the medical profession can be construed as an acknowledgement of, 
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and answer to, that bad history.  2526
At this point, the proponents of  neurointerventions for treating socially undesirable 
behaviour may hope that they too have some easy way to defend themselves against an ethical 
pessimistic induction akin to the defences that are available for medicine. However, the rest of  
this chapter will be devoted to suggesting that the case is not an easy one to make, although I 
do not aim to show that all things considered we should not engage in neurointerventions to 
treat crime. The history of  neurointerventions is only one dimension to the necessary ethical 
debate, providing a defeasible reason or presumption against opting for this means again. 
3. The modern incarnation of  neurointerventions 
I consider two easy ways of  defending neurointerventions for treating socially undesirable be-
haviour from a historically based pessimism that spring to mind: one, that different people are 
targeted, the other that science is better now. First, then, one might argue that was wrong in the 
cases of  bad neurointerventions outlined in the introduction is that they targeted for the most 
part those who should not have been: rebellious women, gay men, and so on. Yet, that response 
does not capture all the instances of  treatment that ground the claim that the history of  neu-
rointerventions is one of  appalling cases. For example, consider the treatment of  the ‘criminally 
insane’. It is not the case that the only wrong done was targeting the wrong people. Rather the 
#  For example, in the UK, the General Medical Council, on informed consent and patient rights, avail25 -
able at http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/consent_guidance_index.asp; and NHS 
guidelines, available at http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/consent-to-treatment/pages/introduction.aspx. 
On medical experiments see for example the World Health Organisation’s guidelines, in ‘Standards and 
operational guidance for ethics review of  health-related research with human participants’, WHO Press, 
2011. Available at http://www.who.int/ethics/research/en/.
 As a clear instance of  this, consider the Nuremberg Code, regarding experiments on human subjects, 26
which was a direct response to the appalling experiments done in Nazi concentration camps. For a discus-
sion, see Leaning, Jennifer, ‘War crimes and medical science’, BMJ (1996), p. 313.
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wrong also lies in what was done to those people for the sake of  ensuring socially desirable be-
haviour. Lobotomies, even on those prone to aggression who sometimes had episodes of  vio-
lent behaviour, are a step too far, for instance, given the possible effects of  the treatment in 
severely diminishing a person’s capacities. 
 Further, simply targeting different people fails to address directly the entirety of  the 
ethical pessimistic induction. That induction raises doubt concerning deploying a particular 
method for achieving a certain kind of  end: using medical or scientific interventions to address 
socially undesirable behaviour. We still have reason to doubt that we will succeed in picking a 
set of  ‘social undesirables’ or in treating that group appropriately, in a proportionate way, 
morally speaking. Even the worst criminal can still demand that we justify imposing such an 
ethically risky form of  treatment on him – given the terrible history – and we are still open to 
moral criticism for doing so without reasons that defeat the pessimistic induction. 
As a second seemingly easy defence one might answer the pessimistic induction by in-
sisting that we are now better at science, such that we know that modern neurointerventions 
for socially undesirable behaviour are likely to work or, at least, that their side effects will be 
less problematic. Certainly, suggestions of  surgery on the brain are less favoured, replaced with 
suggestions of  deploying drugs to alter brain chemistry instead. Perhaps modern science would 
be more light touch than past attempts. One might suggest that, as a result, to perform con-
temporary neurointerventions for socially undesirable behaviour is to pursue a different course 
of  action to their historical incarnation. 
However, it is unclear that modern science has improved sufficiently to block a pes-
simistic induction. The brain is not yet well understood, let alone understood well enough for 
scientists to successfully intervene in only light touch ways. Further, those proposed treat-
ments within the philosophical literature that are even vaguely realistic come with side ef-
fects, which are often severe. So, antidepressants, for instance, can cause side effects includ-
ing loss of  sexual desire, fatigue, insomnia, weight gain, nausea, or anxiety.  Thus, we do not 27
 See, for illustration, http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Antidepressant-drugs/Pages/Side-effects.aspx.27
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seem to have minimally invasive and well-understood treatments to hand. 
The above may express too ‘luddite’ an attitude for some who have greater faith in our 
scientific knowledge or in the possibility of  progress. Alternatively, the applied ethicist who 
favours very hypothetical cases may respond by imagining some perfect case, where we really 
do understand the ways in which the drug will work, and the side effects really are limited. The 
evidence is as good in this hypothetical case, this applied ethicist continues, as our best re-
searched science. Does that answer the pessimistic induction? 
First, to reply, it is unclear that such hypothetical cases are the best starting point. Start-
ing from such cases it may obscure some of  what matters ethically. As one example, our med-
ical treatments are very rarely without side effects, as inspecting the information leaflet in any 
drug packet will demonstrate. So, perhaps it is worth keeping in view the likely costs of  any 
treatment. As another example, many likely neurointerventions for socially undesirable be-
haviour would be experiments, at least in turning what has been a treatment for a clinical popu-
lation into one for a subclinical population or a population with a different issue, such as the 
suggestions of  using antidepressants on the aggressive or providing Ritalin to the impulsive. 
Further, if  we are in the business of  treating ‘criminals’ these experiments would be being car-
ried out on what can be considered a vulnerable population, of  prisoners or potential prisoners. 
This is a population that is in a violent, coercive environment (or, in the case of  those at the 
point of  conviction, threatened with such), whose members are disproportionately likely to 
have passed through the care system and/or be otherwise from a disadvantaged background.  28
Note, here I am not arguing that prisoners should not be experimented on, all things consid-
 For a review of  research about race, poverty and incarceration rates in the US, along with the effects of  28
imprisonment on perpetuating inequality, see Sara Wakefield and Christopher Uggen, ‘Incarceration and 
stratification’ Annual review of  sociology 36 (2010), pp. 387-406. On the care system and imprisonment in the 
UK, see for example E. Kennedy, ‘Children and Young People in Custody 2012–13’ (London: HM In-
spectorate of  Prisons and Youth Justice Board, 2013), who reports that a third of  young offenders had 
been in the care system.
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ered, but rather, that this is an ethical debate that needs to be had, and so a detail of  the real 
world case to which we should attend. As such, it can be unhelpful to abstract away from all 
features of  the likely actual situation in favour of  one’s imagined cases, so obscuring the central 
ethical issues at hand. 
 As a second response, to have less invasive and better understood treatments would 
not address all of  the kinds of  wrongdoing that ground a pessimistic induction. That pes-
simistic induction was grounded not only on accidental harm from treatments not turning out 
as expected, but also the fact that those treated were wronged. Suppose, for instance, that neu-
rointerventions targeting criminals were as well understood as our best medical treatments. Still, 
a fundamental dissimilarity persists, over who benefits. Medicine generally aims to help the in-
dividual.  These neurointerventions used to treat criminals aim to benefit society. When we 29
have deployed medical interventions for such purposes in the past, as in eugenics and psychia-
try, we have gone wrong. 
It might be objected that neurointerventions for those who engage in socially undesir-
able behaviour can be for the benefit of  the person treated, not society, or not only for the 
benefit society.  On the face of  it that would place such treatments on better footing with re30 -
spect to avoiding the pessimistic induction. For some particular examples this line of  response 
might work. Drug addiction treatment for who would like to cease to be addicts may be one 
such example. But it is largely implausible as a reconstruction of  the reasons for such treat-
ments for undesirable behaviour in general. So, to defend the reconstruction would be to claim 
that the individual treated always benefits from no longer being someone likely to act in socially 
undesirable ways and does so enough for this benefit to justify the risks of  the treatment (as-
suming here, for the sake of  argument only, that this is something the interventions could 
achieve). That claim, however, will be hard to defend. For a start, it takes an implausibly pater-
 There are some exceptions in public health, such as vaccines and quarantines, although the latter will 29
often also benefit the individual and is very carefully restricted in many countries.
 With thanks to David Birks for pressing this objection. 30
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nalistic stance in its claims to know about what is really good for an individual. Someone might 
prefer to remain as they were, or to be unaffected by the side effects of  treatment. Further, to 
claim that the treatment is for the individual’s own good since ‘fixing’ their ‘criminality’ would 
mean that they escaped further imprisonment is questionable. Given that the conviction rates 
for many crimes are very low, such a calculation may not work, especially for crimes where the 
individual gets some benefit from committing it. Finally, it may be objectionable, morally speak-
ing, to define an individual’s own good, and so justify treatment, in terms of  what we as a soci-
ety make true; for instance, that imprisonment is worse than the side effects of  medical treat-
ment owing to the nature of  our jails.
 
31
So, neither claiming that we now target the right people nor that we now have better 
science suffices to defeat the pessimistic induction. Yet what motivates these easy defences 
might be an underlying belief  in progress. As we make the kinds of  moral and scientific mis-
takes found in the history of  neurointerventions for socially undesirable behaviour, one might 
think that we get more likely to be right the next time.  We would now be better at picking the 32
right people to implement such interventions on, or at coming up with appropriate interven-
tions proportionate to our ends. However, on what grounds could one defend such a Whiggish 
view of  moral progress? There seems to be little evidence in our history that moral failings are 
seldom repeated. Genocides, to take one exemplar of  a moral atrocity, are not one-off  moral 
mistakes, but rather a repeating phenomenon.  
Conclusion: The prospects for neurointerventions 
So, proponents of  neurointerventions to treat socially undesirable behaviours or tendencies 
that way should care about the history of  such interventions, since that history grounds a 
presumption against taking this course of  action. The history does so by motivating a pes-
 This may be related to Cohen’s interpersonal test, e.g. see G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality 31
(Harvard University Press, 2008).
 With thanks to Chris Nathan and Chris Mills for suggesting this objection.32
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simistic induction that requires answering. We need some account of  why current neuroint-
erventions as a response to socially undesirable behaviour are different to those of  the past, 
in ethically salient ways. Furthermore, just performing these interventions on different 
people and with the use of  modern science may not suffice to escape that induction. 
There is, however, something further that we can draw from the pessimistic induction, 
which may provide a way for proponents of  neurointerventions for undesirable behaviour to 
improve their chances, ethically speaking. That further something is the context in which neu-
rointerventions are placed, both in comparison to medicine in general and as a practice amongst 
other ethically similar practices – i.e. other uses of  medical interventions for the purposes of  
social control or the social good, such as eugenics and the worst elements of  psychiatry. This 
context might provide us with some clues when making the case for neurointerventions against 
a terrible history. To conclude, then, I gesture towards the clues that might arise. 
So, from the context, we might gain some sense of  how to avoid ethical pitfalls. When 
do medical interventions, and especially psychiatric ones, avoid being unethical? One part of  
the answer is that they are sometimes ethical when they are genuinely for the benefit of  the in-
dividual and we steer clear of  assumptions about who is or is not ‘fit’ and about whose be-
haviour is socially undesirable. Further, a treatment should not be tested on a vulnerable popu-
lation, its side effects should have been carefully tested, and its degree of  invasiveness and risk 
of  side effects should be proportional to its aims. Medics should treat only with consent and 
with regard to the patient’s own interests. 
There will be a set of  other salient concerns to fill out here. But perhaps addressing 
concerns like the above would provide a route for proponents of  neurointerventions in 
those accused or convicted of  crimes to answer the pessimistic induction. They could draw 
on the ethical improvements of  medicine and psychiatry, along with the reasons why eugen-
ics and some part of  psychiatry were abhorrent, to propose a limited but more ethically se-
cure course of  action involving neurointerventions. Taking this route would still make histo-
ry relevant: it is the history that informs us about what to attend to ethically speaking. 
!20
However, the proponent of  neurointerventions who takes such a route may end up 
with a nearly empty, or at least radically limited, set of  proposals. Certainly, it is unclear that 
many (or any) of  the suggested neurointerventions for criminals would exhibit all of  these eth-
ical improvements, with the exception of  optional drug addiction treatment. Any neurointer-
ventions that meet these ethical improvements will not be treating those convicted of  crimes 
for the sake of  altering undesirable behaviour, to benefit society, or to punish, nor would they 
be coercive or otherwise violate the requirements of  informed consent. To propose neuroint-
erventions that do reflect all the ethical improvements of  modern medicine and psychiatry 
may be just to say that doctors should continue to treat those who suffer from physical or 
mental illnesses, who desire and consent to treatment, and only where the means are propor-
tionate to the ends. In short, neurointerventions become permissible where they are part of  
normal medical practice, subject to the usual restrictions on that context. This continuation of  
the status quo is not, it seems, what the proponents of  neurointerventions as a way to treat 
criminals had in mind. 
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